This appendix provides additional information about the formal model, the dataset and coding rules, as well as the different robustness tests mentioned in the article. The 
A.1
Step-by-step calculations for arriving at the expression of the bias from the formal model in Section 3.3
This section provides the detailed calculations behind the expressions presented in the article. Some of the discussion and clarification of the model provided in the paper is also entered here, and only modified slightly:
As described in the article, we consider a measure of democracyφ that is a function not only of actual regime type, φ, but also alternation, a. A regime measure, such as DD, where both the existence of democratic institutions (φ = 1) and alternation of government (a = 1) are necessary conditions for being scored democratic (φ = 1), can be modeled using a multiplicative expression (see, e.g., Goertz 2005):
Further, we model growth, η, as a function of (actual) regime type. To keep the model as simple as possible, we parameterize the model using the linear specification
Finally, the probability of (post-election) alternation in government is positively associated with being a democracy, but alternation also becomes less likely when economic growth is high. Hence, a = a(φ, η); ∂a ∂φ > 0, ∂a ∂η < 0. Again, we employ a linear specification and simplify by assuming that alternation happens whenever the probability of it exceeds a critical threshold c. a = 1 ⇔ β 0 + β 1 φ − β 2 η ≥ c a = 0 ⇔ β 0 + β 1 φ − β 2 η < c
In order to explore how growth is affected by changes in the regime measure -i.e. and insert this along with the expression for a from 9 into Equation 7:
We insert once again for φ, and further manipulate this expression: 
We thereafter apply implicit derivation of this function (considering η as a function ofφ) to find an expression for 
We can now obtain an expression of the alternation-induced bias that we are interested in by subtracting the actual effect of regime type on growth (b 1 ) from that directly above denoting the anticipated "effect" of our regime measure on growth:
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A.2 Construction of regime-type variables
This section lists the main variables used in the analysis, and describes how they are coded. Some regime type variables are taken directly from the original datasets described in the paper -see Section 4.1 and 5 in the paper for the sources for the different control variables and dependent variables -while other regime variables are created by combining information from existing variables. Below we also, for instance, describe in more detail how the real-time DD variable is coded, including how its constituent variables are created.
A.2.1 Regime type variables taken directly from original data
• DD: Regime type variable from the online dataset (DD dataset) of Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010).
• Type2 : The Type II variable in the DD dataset
• BMR: Regime type variable taken from Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013)
A.2.2 Constructed variables
• Democracywithouttype2 : This variable is constructed according to the "recipe"
given in the Cheibub et al. (2010) codebook, but without the Type II criterion.
Thus, using Cheibub et al.'s variable names, this dummy is coded as 1 if:
-exselec< 3
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-legselec= 2 and -closed= 2 and -dejure= 2 and -defacto2= 2 and -lparty= 2
• Alternationproximity: This variable is coded as years since alternation in power, using the alternation variable from the PIPE dataset by Przeworski (2013) . 13 The original Cheibub et al. codebook rather requires exselec < 2, but this is obviously a typo, since exselec= 2 identifies regimes where the executive is indirectly elected.
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• Durationcurrentregimerules: This variable measures the number of years a country has had the same regime rules (specified as the rules that justify a democracy coding on DD, except for the alternation rule). This is created to ensure that there are no "subjective judgements" regarding what "similar rules" means in the interpretation of "alternation under similar rules". For left-censored observations (i.e., regimes originating from before 1946), we employ the equivalent variables from the PIPE dataset.
• Real-timePIPE : This variable codes real time-democracy for all countries using the PIPE dataset, to avoid that countries in the DD dataset are left-censored when we construct the real-time DD variable using the Cheibub et al. data. In other words, this variable codes real-time democracy according to the DD rules, but using information from PIPE (the first observation year in this dataset is 1917).
More specifically, it is used to assign a real-time DD score for regimes that enter the DD dataset in 1946 until relevant new information about the regime is registered in the DD dataset.
• Real-timeDD (with CGV override rule): This variable codes real-time democracy using the DD (and PIPE) dataset. It assigns a democracy score for regimes that have passed all the DD criteria for democracy, including the alternation rule, in "real time" (before or in the observation year in question). That is, this variable does not score democracy retrospectively (when alternation occurs later in time), unlike the original DD variable. This variable is coded 1 in a given year iff:
-(there has been an alternation within the period a country has had democratic rules (i.e alternation proximity < duration of current regime rules), OR -Real-timePIPE scores a country as a democracy when it enters the DD dataset,) AND -the country is scored as a democracy in the DD dataset (this is what we call the "CGV override rule", since a dictatorship (0) score by the actual Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) coding will override a democracy (1) score prov vided by following the other rules; this criterion is added to incorporate the information about changes to "regime rules", which is, in part, based on subjective assessments in the DD dataset. See further description below.)
• Real-timeDD (Expansive): This variable is coded using the coding criteria listed for the first Real-timeDD measure above, but without the CGV override rule.
vi

A.3 A note on different ways of coding Real-timeDD
Our real-time democracy variable(-s) codes a country as democratic if and only if it has passed the first three DD rules (elected legislature, elected executive, and there is more than one party), and there has been an alternation in power (before or during the relevant year of measurement) under similar rules. However, the italicized part of this last requirement leads to a number of difficulties:
It is obvious from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010, 69) that the rules in question are electoral rules, but deciding which rules are relevant and important enough to warrant starting a "new" period -within which we must observe alternation in order for DD to score a country as a democracy -necessarily introduces an element of subjectivity into the DD coding. Democracies make minor changes to their electoral laws all the time, and counting each change in the electoral law as ushering in a new period within which alternation is required is neither feasible nor practiced by the authors of DD.
Yet, this makes it very hard to reproduce the DD scores when only using information on alternation in power and the other subcomponents used to capture contestation in the DD dataset (described in the coding manual above). One could think of two ways to incorporate the requirement of (alternation taking place under) "similar rules": One is to code this manually, on a case-by-case basis, such that whenever one observes an alternation in power, one back-codes the democracy score to the year where one observes some relevant change in the electoral rules. Another is to use objective data on clearly specified changes in electoral rules, such that whenever one observes an alternation in power we use these data on changes in electoral rules to decide how far back we can code a country as a democracy. Ideally, we would like to follow the second strategy, by using a clearly defined and valid measure capturing changes in electoral rules. Since such a measure is not available, we have opted for two imperfect, but different, ways to account for this issue when coding the real-time DD variable:
The first -used for Real-timeDD (Expansive) -codes a change in the relevant electoral rules only if there has been a coup, auto-coup, foreign occupation OR there has been a change in the subcomponents making up the democracy score in DD (except, of course, vii for the Type II variable). This coding, in practice, means that some countries will be classified as real-time democracies in our data (hence, the term "Expansive") but not as democracies in DD. The reason is that for some countries, the alternation in power that we count as relevant for assigning a democracy score on our real-timeDD measure actually occurred under rules that the coders of DD will count as different electoral rules.
Hence, past alternations -and their implications for a country being scored democratic -may be carried over to a new regime operating under very different electoral rules for this "expansive" coding. As a consequence, when we use this coding of real-timeDD, we get 160 observations that are democratic according to Real-time DD, but dictatorial according to DD.
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The second strategy -used for Real-timeDD (with CGV override rule), and which is our preferred strategy -is to incorporate the implicit information on changes in electoral rules inherent in each (original) DD democracy coding, by proposing that a country is not a real-time democracy if it is a dictatorship according to the DD coding by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland. This is referred to as the "CGV override rule". This real-time measure, which is arguably the more valid alternative, is thus more closely aligned with the original way of coding DD. In practice, this means that the 160 diverging country-years mentioned above are coded dictatorial also on the real-time measure. The variable, then, essentially incorporates both the explicit (coded) information on multiparty competition (found in the DD dataset), the information on alternations using the PIPE data, and the tacit information on relevant regime rules that is behind each democracy coding in the DD data.
Even though these differences in coding rules for one type of variable may seem confusing (and perhaps tedious), we describe and present these alternative coding schemes in the interest of transparency. Fortunately, however, choosing one over the other does not dramatically alter our results by much, although the results indicating support of our argument on the alternation rule and the proposed bias for growth are somewhat stronger when using the version with the CGV override rule. In the expansive real-time 14 Examples are Apartheid South Africa (where an alternation occurred in 1948), Zambia (where an alternation occurred in 1991), and Guyana (where an alternation occurred in 1992).
viii DD coding, we include a number of fast-growing countries as real-time democracies that are not democratic according to DD, which means that our growth estimates for real-time DD are slightly more positive than the growth estimates for real-time DD using the CGV override rule, essentially biasing the results in our disfavor (compare, for instance, Figure   2 to Figure A.1) .
15 In the paper, Table 3 Finally, even when we apply the CGV override rule, some cases that are scored as democracies in the original DD coding will not be coded as real-time democracies even when extending the year of measurement towards the end of the sample period. These are a handful of observations that fail to register as real-time democracies using the alternation data included in the PIPE dataset. Further, we simply do not know whether these cases are, in fact, "real-time democracies" (but where the alternations fail to register in PIPE), or whether they are simply miscodings in DD. Notable cases include Chile, Liberia and Switzerland. For example, 15 Figure A.1 also shows that, in the last years where we have data -when we should expect baseline DD and real-time DD to converge, since real-time DD and baseline DD increasingly relies on the same information as time passes -the expansive real-time DD variable actually produces more positive growth estimates than the original DD measure. This can be attributed to the relatively high growth of the handful of regimes where an alternation has occurred in the past, but under regime rules that CGV count as different than those currently operating in the country. When we use the CGV override rule, which we personally find most appropriate, the growth estimates are close to identical in the final years of the period. This issue is not raised to put neither DD nor PIPE in a bad light. As anyone who has coded a dataset has experienced -especially where a large team of coders has been involved -errors occur. Such errors only become truly problematic when there is some systematic component to them, which we have no reason to believe in this case.
However, for some outcomes that are relatively rare, such as coup attempts and civil wars, even (infrequent) random errors might cause problems. We believe that the discrepancy discussed above might be the explanation for why the estimated probability lines for original DD and real-time DD in the rightmost panel (on coup attempts) of Figure 2 do not converge when we get closer to the end date of the sample. Even a handful of cases, generated by random errors, might impact on the estimated probability, since coups are such rare events. In contrast, for economic growth -a continuous variable with close to a normal distribution -the above issue seems to be more or less irrelevant. This is indicated by the convergence of original and real-time DD growth estimates at the end of the period in Figure 2 , and by the fact that conducting robustness checks such as correcting the obvious miscoding of Switzerland (see below) does not affect results.
x A.4 Studies on democracy and growth, measure used, and results 
Polity
Baum and Lake employ systems of (two) OLS PCSE regressions and report a positive indirect effect of democracy on growth through increased human capital accumulation (as proxied by life expectancy in poorer countries and secondary schooling in richer). They draw on data from 128 countries, measured over the time period 1967-1997. Interestingly, the authors note (footnote 13, p.339) that "results are comparable for the education system, but somewhat weaker, though still correctly signed, for the life expectancy system" when using ACLP/DD. They interpret this as primarily stemming from "the relative lack of variation in this dichotomous indicator, which captures only wholesale regime changes".
Gerring, Bond, Barndt and Moreno (2005) Polity index and "Democracy stock"
The authors run several fixed effects regressions including more than 6000 country-year observations (up to 180 countries, 1950-2000) . Gerring et al. do not identify a clear effect of the standard version of the Polity index in these fixed effects models, but they do find a very robust effect of their "Democracy Stock" measure calculated from historical Polity Index values (from 1900 onwards). when estimating structurally similar equations involving sets of regime dummies as independent variables and economic growth as dependent variable. When following Rodrik and Wacziarg in using Polity as basis for their regime dummies, they find that "New Democracy" has a positive and significant (5 percent level) coefficient, and this is the only significant regime-category dummy. When using the DD data as basis, however, they find that the "New Democracy" coefficient is dramatically reduced (and now far from significant), whereas the "Established Autocracy" dummy changes sign and is now positive and significant at the 10 percent level. Knutsen (2011b) 1) ACLP/DD; 2) Polity; 3) Freedom House
Knutsen (see pp. 290-294) runs four sets of OLS PCSE regressions on about 3300 country-year observations (from 1976-2004) . He finds a significant positive effect of democracy in the two most parsimonious model specifications for all three measures. However, the Polity and Freedom House measures remain significant (at least at the 10 percent level) for the two most extensive model specifications incorporating additional controls, whereas ACLP/DD turns out to be far from significant when adding these controls (decade dummies are added to the third model, and absolute latitude, urbanization rate and trade as share of GDP are then further added to the fourth model). Although Knutsen reports that small differences in the sample composition account for some of this divergence (at least when comparing DD to Freedom House), he speculates that the difference may be due to Polity and Freedom House capturing other dimensions of democracy in addition to contestation. xiii Cuba 1955 -58 Mexico 1946 -99 El Salvador 1964 -78 Nicaragua 1951 -78 Peru 1990 -2000 Bolivia 1947 -50 Bolivia 1956 -63 Paraguay 1963 -88 Russia 1991 -2003 Georgia 1991 -2002 Azerbaijan 1992 -2003 Guinea-Bissau 1994 -98 Eq. Guinea 1993 -2003 Gambia 1965 -2003 Senegal 1978 -99 Mauritania 1992 -2003 Niger 1996 Cote d 'Ivoire 1990 -98 Guinea 1995 -2003 Burkina Faso 1978 -79 Burkina Faso 1991 -2003 Liberia 1985 -89 Liberia 1997 -2000 Togo 1994 -2003 Cameroon 1992 -2003 Gabon 1990 -2003 Chad 1997 -2003 Rep. Congo 2002 -03 Kenya 1963 Kenya 1992 -97 Tanzania 1995 -2003 Rwanda 2003 Ethiopia 1994 -2003 Mozambique 1994 -2003 Zambia 1991 -2003 South Africa 1950 -2003 Namibia 1990 -2003 Lesotho 1993 -2003 Botswana 1966 -2003 Madagascar 1960 -71 Seychelles 1993 -2003 Algeria 1997 -2003 Tunisia 1994 -2003 Turkey 1946 -59 Egypt 1976 -2003 Syria 1955 -57 Arab Rep. Yemen 1990 -2003 Tajikistan 1995 -2003 Kyrgyztan 1991 -2003 Uzbekistan 1991 -2003 Kazakhstan 1991 -2003 South Korea 1948 -87 Pakistan 1965 -68 Bangladesh 1979 -81 Sri Lanka 1977 -88 Cambodia 1998 -2003 Malaysia 1971 -2003 Singapore 1984 -2003 Philippines 1978 This section provides tables showing tests discussed, but not reported in tables, in Section 4.1. Most of these are considered robustness tests of our baseline regression models in Table 1 . The sequence of the tables in this section unfolds as follows: First, we report random effects and fixed effects specifications of our baseline models. Second, we show tables applying alternative lag structures to the independent variables (1-and 3-year lags, respectively). Third, we report our baseline models with additional control variables, namely lagged growth (1 and 5-year lags), log regime duration, population growth, plurality religion, and log oil and gas income. Fourth, we show models testing whether our results are robust to restricting the sample by dropping country-year observations that may arguably be considered neither democracies nor autocracies (but, for example, rather as foreign occupied countries or countries experiencing anarchy Table A .6: Robustness testing with random effects models.
Notes: **** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. All models are random effects models with errors clustered on country. Independent variables are lagged with 5 years. Table A .8: Robustness testing with alternative lag structure (1 year).
Notes: **** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. All models are OLS with PCSE, adjusting for panellevel heteroskedasticity, panel-specific AR (1) Table A .9: Robustness testing with alternative lag structure (3 years).
Notes: **** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. All models are OLS with PCSE, adjusting for panellevel heteroskedasticity, panel-specific AR (1) Table A .10: Robustness testing when controlling for lagged growth (5-year lags).
Notes: **** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. All models are OLS with PCSE, adjusting for panellevel heteroskedasticity, panel-specific AR (1) Table A .14: Robustness testing with additional control variable (log oil and gas income).
Notes:**** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. All models are OLS with PCSE, adjusting for panellevel heteroskedasticity, panel-specific AR (1) Notes: **** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. All models are OLS with PCSE, adjusting for panel-level heteroskedasticity, panel-specific AR (1) Table A .16: Robustness testing when excluding "non-regimes" from the sample, using Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014a) data.
Notes: **** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. All models are OLS with PCSE, adjusting for panellevel heteroskedasticity, panel-specific AR (1) This section presents the first-stage estimates of our Heckman models presented in Table 2 in the article, as well as the second-stage estimates for various robustness tests mentioned in the article. The latter are models including additional controls, models run on restricted samples , and models experimenting with 1-and 3-year lags on the independent variables. Table 2 (second-stage equations) -adding log regime duration as control.
Notes: **** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0. Table A .20: Robustness testing the Heckman Treatment-Effects models in Table 2 (second-stage equations) -using 1-year lags on independent variables.
Notes: **** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0. Table A .21: Robustness testing the Heckman Treatment-Effects models in Table 2 (second-stage equations) -restricting regime data to , and lagging independent variables with 5 years.
Notes: **** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. All models are Heckman-type Treatment-Effects model. GDP per capita growth (in percentage) is dependent variable. Independent variables are lagged with 5 years. Democracy is considered endogenous, and WAVE from Knutsen (2011b) -capturing whether the regime originated within one of Huntington's (1991) reverse waves of democratization or not -is used as instrument in the first stage. Table 2 (second-stage equations) -restricting regime data to , and lagging independent variables with 1 year.
Notes: **** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. All models are Heckman-type Treatment-Effects model. GDP per capita growth (in percentage) is dependent variable. Independent variables are lagged with 1 year. Democracy is considered endogenous, and WAVE from Knutsen (2011b) -capturing whether the regime originated within one of Huntington's (1991) reverse waves of democratization or not -is used as instrument in the first stage.
xxxiv A.8 Robustness tests for Section 4.3.
As discussed in our codebook there are two different ways of coding our real-time measure. This section therefore displays robustness checks on our real-time DD tests using the alternative coding rule from what was, respectively, presented in Table 3 and Figure 2 of the paper. First, however, we show robustness tests of our results from Table   2 when including additional controls. 1946 -70 1946 -70 1946 -80 1946 -80 1946 -90 1946 Table A .23: Robustness tests with 1-year lag on independent variables: Correcting historical Type II errors in DD, and investigating the bias in the estimated effect of democracy on growth.
Notes: **** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Models are OLS with PCSE, adjusting for panel-level heteroskedasticity, panel-specific AR(1) autocorrelation, and contemporaneous correlation. Independent variables are lagged 1 year. Maximum time series is given in top row (for independent variables). Real-time DD is calculated using historical information on alternations available at last year of sample. Original DD coding is from Cheibub et al. (2010) .
xxxv 1946 -70 1946 -70 1946 -80 1946 -80 1946 -90 1946 Notes: **** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Models are OLS with PCSE, adjusting for panellevel heteroskedasticity, panel-specific AR(1) autocorrelation, and contemporaneous correlation. Independent variables are lagged 5 years. Maximum time series is given in top row (for independent variables). Real-time DD is calculated using historical information on alternations available at last year of sample. Original DD coding is from Cheibub et al. (2010) .
xxxvi 1946 -70 1946 -70 1946 -80 1946 -80 1946 -90 1946 Notes: **** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Models are OLS with PCSE, adjusting for panel-level heteroskedasticity, panel-specific AR(1) autocorrelation, and contemporaneous correlation. Independent variables are lagged 5 years. Maximum time series is given in top row (for independent variables). Real-time DD is calculated using historical information on alternations available at last year of sample. Original DD coding is from Cheibub et al. (2010) .
xxxvii Models including country-fixed effects do not find the expected difference between the original and real-time DD estimates, but rather report differences in the opposite direction. However, we think there are very good reasons for being careful when it comes to interpreting the results from these models. As we note in footnote 12 of the article, a "reason is the lack of within-country variation in the dichotomous regime measure, leading to inefficient estimates. This is amplified by short time series; for the 1970s regressions, only 25 countries had experienced regime changes according to DD and 15 to real-time DD. Countries without changes ... do not influence fixed-effects estimates.
We thus draw inferences using information from a small set of countries".
In a sense the logic of the real-time DD test is to compare estimates where we hold everything constant, and only change the coding of particular countries -thus isolating "country-specific coding changes" as the factor that varies over the two regressions. Paradoxically, this approach does not work as well when comparing two fixed effects models:
Japan, for example, is coded as democratic for the entire time series by original DD and as autocratic for the entire time series by real-time DD in all the regression models in Table A .26. Hence, it does not affect the regime coefficients for any of the two fixed effects models, and we cannot learn anything about our proposed alternation-rule bias by correcting the Type II error observations from Japan in one of the regressions and not in the other. Although incorporating country-fixed effects may appropriately be considered a prerequisite for drawing strong inferences on substantive causal effects between, e.g., income and democracy (see, e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2008) , we are therefore hesitant to trust the comparisons of fixed effects models when conducting this particular test of the alternation-rule bias.
xxxviii 1946 -70 1946 -70 1946 -80 1946 -80 1946 -90 1946 Notes: **** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. The models include country-fixed effects and errors are clustered on country. Independent variables are lagged 5 years. Maximum time series is given in top row (for independent variables). Real-time DD is calculated using historical information on alternations available at last year of sample. Original DD coding is from Cheibub et al. (2010) . Table A .27 on the next page -which invokes the CGV override rule -with Table 3 in the article further illustrates this point. The results in the appendix table -at least for the 1946-1970 and 1946-1980 samples -provide stronger indications of our proposed alternation-rule-induced bias than the results provided in the table included in the article.
Finally, Table A .28 shows results for models equivalent to Table 2 (2010) and to real-time DD coding (with 90 percent CIs) from OLS PCSE regressions, specified as in Table 3 , for samples from 1946 to year given by x-axis.
Notes: The real-time DD coding in this figure is produced solely on the basis of the four formal rules, and does not incorporate the "CGV override rule" which lets the Cheibub et al. scoring of dictatorships override democracy scores produced by the formal rules (160 observations in total for whole dataset).
xli 1946 -70 1946 -70 1946 -80 1946 -80 1946 -90 1946 Notes: **** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Models are OLS with PCSE, adjusting for panel-level heteroskedasticity, panel-specific AR(1) autocorrelation, and contemporaneous correlation. Independent variables are lagged 5 years. Maximum time series is given in top row (for independent variables). Real-time DD is calculated using historical information on alternations available at last year of sample, and for this alternative specification all originally DD-coded democracies are also coded real-time democracies ("override rule"). Original DD coding is from Cheibub et al. (2010) .
xlii 1946 -70 1946 -70 1946 -80 1946 -80 1946 -90 1946 Table A .29: Testing for potential bias, induced by the DD measure, in the estimated effect of democracy on civil war onset.
Notes: **** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Logit models of the impact of regime type on civil war onset. T-statistics in parenthesis, standard errors clustered on countries.
xliv 1946-70 1946-70 1946-80 1946-80 1946-90 1946- Figure A .2: Simulated probability of experiencing civil war onsets (left) and coup attempts (right) for originally coded DD democracies and real-time DD democracies (expansive coding), for samples from 1946 to year given by x-axis (t).
Notes: All covariates (see Tables A.30 for civil wars) and A.31 for coups) are held at median values. For civil war estimation starts for t = 1970 since models for shorter samples will not converge (few democracies experience civil wars). For coups, estimation starts in t = 1980 for the same reason. This real-time DD coding does not invoke the CGV override rule.
